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Terror Management and Self-Enhancement:
The Moderating Role of Self-Esteem and Need for Closure

Nathan A. Heflick
ABSTRACT

Terror management theory posits that self-esteem ultimately protects people from
death anxiety. Much research has demonstrated that individuals reminded of death tend to
self-enhance. However, more recent research suggests that need for closure and selfesteem might moderate these findings, but no research has directly tested this. It was
hypothesized that for people high in self-esteem, mortality salience will not affect selfenhancement. However, for individuals low in self-esteem, it will either increase
enhancement (if low in closure) or increase verification (if high in closure). These
hypotheses were fully supported using Christian’s perceptions of God’s love as the
dependent variable. Implications for terror management theory, self-verification theory,
and religious belief are discussed.

ii

Introduction
Self-Enhancement, Self-Verification and God’s Love
Christianity teaches that God judges every human being for their actions and their
beliefs. Moreover, through prayer, it teaches that a relationship can be developed between
God and humans. Correlational research indicates that that these relationships reduce
loneliness (Kirkpatrick, Shillito & Kellas, 1999) and, just like human to human
relationships, they differ according to self-esteem (Kirkpatrick, 1998) with people low in
self-esteem believing that God is less loving. Ironically, however, low self-esteem
individuals are more drawn to these relationships than individuals with high self-esteem
(Kirkpatrick, 1998). But why would individuals low in self-esteem be drawn to an
unloving God (especially in light of the possibility that an unloving God could sentence
them to eternal damnation)?
From a traditional terror management perspective (Greenberg, Pyszczynski &
Solomon, 1986), Christians should be motivated to believe that God views them
favorably, because self-esteem is essential to managing death concerns. Supporting this,
mortality salience increases self-enhancement (e.g., Dechesne et al., 2003) and group
enhancement (e.g., Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt & Schimel, 2000) and trait self-esteem
reduces mortality salience induced worldview defense (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999;
Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Although TMT posits that epistemic needs such as certainty,
structure and predictability also help people manage death anxiety (e.g., Landau et al.,
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2004), esteem needs are typically viewed as more central to managing anxiety (e.g.,
Greenberg, 2008).
However, the picture is likely not as simple as mortality salience always leading
to self-esteem promotion. First, because self-esteem has been found to moderate
mortality salience effects on worldview defense (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999),
individuals high in self-esteem (who are buffered from death salience by their selfesteem) might not have the need to enhance when death is salient. Secondly, research
based on self-verification theory (SVT; Swan, 1983) suggests that, at least under certain
conditions, people address epistemic needs at the expense of esteem needs. For instance,
individuals, even if they are low in self-esteem, choose relationship partners that perceive
them as they perceive themselves (self-verify them; Hixon & Swann, 1993; Swann,
Wenzlaff & Tafforadi, 1992). Because mortality salience also heightens epistemic needs
(Landau et al., 2004; Dechesne & Wigboldus, 2001; Schimel et al., 1999), it could be that
people high in these needs will self-verify when death is salient even when this conflicts
with self-esteem protection (e.g., low self-esteem individuals choosing partners that treat
them less positively). In terms of perceptions of God’s love, this suggests that death
concerns might actually motivate low self-esteem Christians to view God as less loving,
because this verifies their self-view and, in turn, provides epistemic needs.
In the following research, I measured self-esteem and need for closure before
exposing people to mortality salience or an aversive control topic. I then gave (Christian)
participants the opportunity to self-enhance by agreeing or disagreeing with a positive or
negative message about God’s love for them. In doing so, I was able to test my
hypotheses that (a) people high in self-esteem should not self-enhance when death is
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salient, and (b) that for individuals low in self-esteem, but high in epistemic needs,
reminders of mortality will motivate self-verification even though this conflicts with selfenhancement.
Terror Management Theory and Self-Esteem
The need for self-esteem is clearly powerful. Research indicates that people see
themselves as better than average in a wide range of things, such as morality (Baumhart,
1968), health (Larwood, 1978) and reliability (Hoorens, 1993). In addition, people often
resort to various strategies to preserve or strengthen this image such as downward
comparison (Vohs & Heatherton, 2004), avoiding threats to the self (Pyszczynski, 1982),
lowering expectations (Norem & Cantor, 1986) and discounting sources of criticism
(Miller & Ross, 1975). Moreover, research shows that people display a “cognitive
conceit” even at an implicit level, preferring their own initials to others and even tending
to choose careers, marital partners and living places that share letters with one’s name
(e.g., Pelham, Mirenberg & Jones, 2002).
Building on the work of Ernest Becker, (1971/1972) terror management theory
(TMT; Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1986) posits that people are strongly
motivated to self-enhance and protect self-esteem, because doing so protects them from
anxiety associated with death. According to TMT, the awareness of death places humans
in a unique and potentially terrifying predicament. Although humans share with other
animals the biological inclination toward self-preservation, humans also have a unique
ability to see into the future, which ultimately makes them aware of their inevitable
demise. This is problematic because no matter what people devote their lives to, people
know that deep down it could ultimately end. Leo Tolstoy (as cited in James, 1902,
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p.141) captured this existential angst poignantly stating, “This is the literal incontestable
truth …Why should I live? ... Is there in life any purpose which the inevitability of death
that awaits me does not undo and destroy?”
In response to this realization, TMT argues that humans developed shared
standards of what is valued in a culture (cultural worldviews). By living up to these
standards, humans develop self-worth. By contributing to cultural meaning systems that
continue beyond death, humans achieve symbolic immortality (a sense that they have left
their “mark” and will be remembered) and/or literal immortality, which is the sense that
one will live in a future life.
Over 250 studies have supported hypotheses derived from terror management
theory (Greenberg, 2008). In support of the role of worldviews in terror management,
people reminded of their mortality (mortality salience) show an increased defense of their
cultural worldview (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 2002). For instance,
people in the United States who are reminded of death, compared to aversive control
topics, become more supportive of US wars (Pyszczynski et. al, 2006), show increased
disdain for an anti-US author (Greenberg et. al, 1990) and show more discomfort using
the US flag in culturally inappropriate ways (Greenberg, Simon, Porteus & Solomon &
Pyszczynski, 1995). Perhaps more strikingly, H. McGregor et al., (1998) found that
mortality salience lead to actual violence against worldview threatening others.
Specifically, participants were given the opportunity to administer amounts of hot sauce
to people who threatened their political views. When thinking about death, they
administered more hot sauce to this target. Interestingly, more recent work has also found
that implicit death cognitions (e.g., completing GR_ _ _ with “grave” rather than “grape”)
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increase when people’s beliefs are challenged (Friedman, 2008; Schimel, Hayes,
Williams & Jahrig, 2007) and dissipate when people have the chance to defend their
beliefs (Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). This body of work suggests that, consistent with
TMT, mortality salience increases negative, even violent, reactions toward others that
threaten people’s beliefs and that defending such beliefs help people manage existential
concerns associated with death.
More directly related to the proposed research, terror management theory posits
that self-esteem is an anxiety buffer that ultimately protects people from fear of death.
Accordingly, from a TMT perspective, if self-esteem buffers people from death anxiety,
then thinking about death should increase the pursuit of self-esteem. Supporting this,
participants reminded of death exaggerate the success of their own group (Dechesne et
al., 2000) and de-identify with groups that are framed negatively, but identify more
strongly with groups framed positively (Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel & Pyszczynski,
2002). Further, they show increased intentions to engage in behaviors they derive selfesteem from, even if they are risky (e.g., reckless driving; Taubman, Florian &
Mikulincer, 2003). Moreover, mortality salience has been found to increase self-serving
attributional biases (Mikulincer & Florian, 2002) and self-enhancement (e.g., agreement
with positive personality feedback; Dechesne et. al, 2003). Interestingly, just like
worldviews, challenging people’s self-esteem also increases death thoughts (Hayes,
Schimel, Faucher & Williams, 2008) and reducing the threat of death by exposing
participants to “scientific evidence” of an afterlife eliminates self-enhancement under
mortality salience (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009)
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At first glance, this body of research seems consistent with TMT researchers’
(e.g., Mikulincer & Florian, 2002) assertion that all people should deal with mortality
concerns by enhancing the self. Importantly, however, research has never simultaneously
tested if self-enhancement under mortality salience differs as a function of trait selfesteem or epistemic needs. Below, I explore the potential implications of testing for
moderation of epistemic needs and trait self-esteem.
TMT research shows that people self-enhance and protect self-esteem more when
death is salient. But, research has never tested if self-esteem moderates enhancement
when death is salient. So, why is this problematic? First, worldview defense is often
reduced under mortality salience for individuals high in self-esteem (Arndt & Greenberg,
1999). Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon (1997) increased
people’s self-esteem or provided them with neutral feedback. People with increased selfesteem later did not respond to mortality salience with worldview defense; however,
individuals provided with neutral feedback did. In follow-up studies, they also found that
high trait self-esteem protects people from psychological defenses when death is salient.
Thus, although TMT theorists have consistently concluded that people always promote or
at least protect self-esteem (Landau & Greenberg, 2006) when death is salient, other
research in this tradition (and the theory itself) suggests that this might not be true for
people high in self-esteem.
Secondly, this is problematic because most people have a positive self-concept
(e.g., Alicke et al., 1995). So, when most people respond to mortality salience with
increased self-esteem pursuit, they are also responding to it with increased selfverification (wanting others to view them as they view themselves). In turn, because they
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have not looked at self-esteem’s role in self-enhancement under mortality salience,
researchers could be inaccurately drawing conclusion viewed as consistent with terror
management theory (i.e. that reminders of death motivate self-enhancement because it
promotes self-esteem), without actually testing if the motive is self-esteem protection or
self-verification. As will be discussed below, this is problematic because the awareness of
death motivates both esteem and epistemic needs, and epistemic needs are often served
by self-verification (Swann, Rentfrow & Guinn, 2003).
Terror Management and Need for Closure
Building on the theorizing of Lecky (1945), self-verification theory (SVT: Swann,
1987) posits that individuals are strongly motivated to create social worlds that enable
others to see them as they see themselves. For individuals high in self-esteem,
verification and esteem needs lead to the same outcome (e.g., choosing a partner that
holds them in high regard). However, for individuals low in self-esteem, verification
leads to creating a world that reinforces one’s own negative self-image. According to
SVT (Swann, 1983), people choose to self-verify, often at the expense of selfenhancement, for both relationship and epistemic needs. In terms of epistemic needs,
self-verification enables individuals to know what to expect, and with that comes
certainty, predictability and coherence. In contrast, enhancement, when it is not also
verifying, is more related to confusion and a lack of structure and clarity, because social
situations that are not consistent with the self-concept are more unpredictable. As Swann,
Rentfrow and Guinn (2003, pp. 368) wrote:
People’s self-views represent the lens through which they perceive reality,
lending meaning to all experiences. Should people’s self-views flounder,
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they will have been stripped of their fundamental means of knowing the
world.
Research (e.g., Swann, Pelham & Krull, 1989) shows the pervasiveness of the
need to self-verify, which according to SVT, facilitates epistemic needs. For instance,
people seek out interaction partners that verify their self-concept (Swann, Pelham &
Krull, 1989). In addition, mildly depressed college students are more likely to elicit
negative than positive feedback from their roommates and the more frequently this
occurs, the more likely they are to be roommates the following semester (Swann,
Wenzloff, Krull & Pelham, 1990). Further, research shows that marriages in which both
partner’s view of the other is consistent with each partner’s self-view have higher levels
of intimacy (Burke & Stets, 1999; De La Ronde & Swann, 1998). Outside of
relationships, when the self-concept is threatened, people show increased pursuit of selfverifying information (Swann & Read, 1981; Swann & Hill, 1982). Interestingly, people
also remember information better if it is consistent with their self-concept (Swann &
Read, 1981), and spend more time reading such evaluations. This body of work suggests
that people not only have a motivation to self-verify in relationships, but also have a
cognitive tendency toward preserving memories consistent with their self-view.
Another theory demonstrating the power of epistemic needs is lay epistemic
theory (Kruglanski, 1989). Lay epistemic theory (LET) holds that people acquire
knowledge and beliefs through observation and experience with others. Because
knowledge strongly motivates human behavior and attitudes, LET stresses the importance
of epistemic needs (predictability, structure, coherence) in understanding human behavior
and mental processes.
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Within LET, most research has explored the human motivation to maintain the
need for closure, which is defined as the need to achieve definite knowledge on a given
topic (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) and consists of five cognitive-motivational traits:
predictability, order, decisiveness, tolerance of ambiguity and closed mindedness.
Research suggests that the need for closure is served by being a firm, staunch supporter
of a worldview; individuals high in need for closure are more negative toward different
others (Doherty, 1998), display more out-group stereotyping (Dijksterhuis, van
Knippenberg, Kruglanski & Schaper, 1996) and have higher levels of in-group bias
(Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998). Moreover, individuals that are high in need for
closure are more likely to endorse political views that resist change (Jost et al., 2007), and
religious beliefs that are more dogmatic (Saraglou, 2002). This suggests that people high
in closure might defend their views (even self-views) more when death is salient, which
should lead to verification and not enhancement.
Terror management theory has long posited that worldviews provide people with
the certainty, predictability and coherence that enable people to develop self-esteem and
hence, manage mortality concerns (Greenberg et al., 1991). Research is now
accumulating to demonstrate the essential role of epistemic needs in managing death
anxiety (Dechesne, Janssen & van Knippenberg (2001). For instance, Landau and
colleagues (2004) found that mortality salience increases desire for clear, well structured
information and for paintings that have a clear, coherent meaning (Landau et al., 2006).
Further, death salience has been found to increase preference for more cultivated
landscapes (Koole & Van den Berg, 2003), for letter sequences that have clear patterns
(e.g., AAAABBBB instead of ABBBAABA; Dechesne & Wigboldus, 2002) and
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stereotypical individuals (Schimel et al., 1998). Lastly, these effects are typically stronger
among people that are high in epistemic needs (e.g., Landau et al., 2004), including need
for closure (e.g., Schimel et al., 2004). Thus, a wide body of evidence suggests that
epistemic needs are heightened by death salience, and often moderate psychological
reactions toward death.
Need for Closure and Self-Esteem
The prevailing view from TMT researchers (e.g., Greenberg, 2008) is that
mortality salience leads to the enhancement and protection of self-esteem. However,
work within this tradition (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) also has found that people
high in self-esteem tend to not respond to reminders of mortality with increased
worldview defense, suggesting that, contrary to researchers’ conclusions, mortality
salience might not lead all people to self-enhance (people high in self-esteem might be
buffered). In addition, research is accumulating that demonstrates the role of epistemic
needs in terror management (e.g., Landau et al., 2004); and SVT suggests that epistemic
needs are served by self-verification (e.g., Swann, 1982). Merging this theorizing, I
hypothesize that people high in self-esteem will not self-enhance when death is salient
(they will be buffered). For individuals low in self-esteem, if they are high in epistemic
needs, they will self-verify when death is salient. But, if people are low in self-esteem
and low in closure, then they will self-enhance.
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Method
Pilot Testing
Past research stresses that self-verification occurs more when the feedback and
the measure of self-esteem are specific and matching (the matching-specificity
hypothesis, Bosson & Swann, 1999). Because I was interested in whether participants
self-verify when mortality is salient, I conducted pilot testing in which participants (N =
120) received one of six messages about the self and God’s love and then completed four
measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg’s global measure, 1965; God contingency, Crocker,
& Luhtanen, 2003; self-liking and self-competence, Taforadi & Swann, 1995). The six
messages were comprised of three sets of two parallel messages, with one of each set
framed positively and one framed negatively. The strongest correlations were found
between the statements, “The message of Christianity is clear: You are worthy (or
unworthy) of God’s love” and the self-liking measure of self-esteem (r = .45 for positive
message, and -.23 for negative message), suggesting that these messages were verifying
for people depending on self-esteem (e.g., high self-esteem people agreed more with
positive message and less with negative message).
Participants
Participants were 145 (50 male) undergraduates that did not participate in the pilot
testing. Because the manipulation discussed what Christianity teaches, participation was
limited to students who answered yes to “do you identify as a Christian?” in a mass
testing questionnaire. To ensure that the messages were at least somewhat relevant to the
participants, participation was further limited to individuals who had attended at least one
religious service in the past year.
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Materials and Procedure
Materials were identical except for the mortality salience (death, no death) prime
and the message (worthy, unworthy) each participant read. These differences were
crossed for all participants and materials were completed in the following order:
Self-Liking Scale. Based on the pilot testing described above, participants
completed the 8-item self-liking subscale of The Self-Liking/Self-Competence Revised
Scale, which has been found to have high reliability and validity (Taforadi & Swann,
2000). This scale measures the extent to which people like themselves. Sample items
include, “I tend to de-value myself” (reverse coded) and “I feel great about who I am.” It
was measured on a Likert Scale (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree) and was
reliable in the current study (α = .82).
Need for Closure Scale. Next, they completed the 47-item Need for Closure
Scale (Kruglanski & Fruend, 1983) which has also been found to be high in validity and
reliability (Leone, Wallace & Modglin, 1999). This scale measures the extent to people
value predictability, structure and clarity. Example items include “I dislike unpredictable
situations” and “I would rather know bad news than be in state of uncertainty.” It was
measured on the same 4-point Likert scale and was reliable (α = .89).
Mortality Salience Prime. After this, participants were primed with either dental
pain or mortality. As in prior TMT research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1991), the mortality
salience prime asked participants respond to two short items: “Please briefly describe the
emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “Jot down, as
specifically as you can what will happen to you as you physically die and once you are
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physically dead.” The dental pain prime asked people to respond to two parallel questions
related to dental pain and sitting in the chair waiting for the dentist.
Self and God’s love. Next, to measure participants’ views about God’s love each
participant was randomly assigned to read one of the two statements chosen as a result of
the pilot testing (i.e., “The message of Christianity is clear: You are worthy (or unworthy)
of God’s love”). Next, participants rated how much they agreed with the statement they
read by responding to three questions. The first read, “The statement I just read was an
accurate reflection of how God views me.” The second read, “I believe that this statement
is a valid measure of how God feels about me,” and the third read, “My friends could
learn a lot about me by reading this statement.” All questions were Likert scored on a 9point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 9 = strongly agree). These questions formed a reliable
scale (α = .86).
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Results
To assess whether Christians self-verified or self-enhanced in their relationship
with God, I performed multiple regression using mortality salience and message type and
mean centered closure and self-esteem as the independent variables with agreement as the
dependent variable. I entered all main effects at step 1, followed by all 2-way interactions
and then all 3-way interactions, and finally, the 4-way interaction. The results revealed no
significant main effect for esteem (p = .21), or mortality salience (p = .93), but did reveal
a main effect for closure, β = .35, SE = .17, p = .03, and message type β = .56, SE = .21, p
< .01. Participants agreed more with the positive message than the negative message.
Also, regardless of message, participants high in need for closure agreed more than
participants low in need for closure. In contrast, no interaction effects approached
significance (ps >.4), including the 4-way interaction (p = .22).
Split Analyses
Although the 4-way interaction did not approach significance, I examined the
hypothesized interaction between closure, self-liking, and mortality salience separately
for participants exposed to the positive and negative message.
For participants who read the positive message, there was a significant 3-way
interaction between closure, self-esteem and mortality salience, β = -.84, SE = .31, p <
.01. Testing for simple interactions revealed that for participants high in self-esteem,
there was no interaction between need for closure and mortality salience (p > .3), whereas
for participants that were low in self-esteem, there was a significant closure by mortality
salience interaction, β = .41, SE= .14, p < .01. Specifically, for low self-esteem
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participants, low need for closure related to more agreement (self-enhancement) when
death was salient compared to the control topic, β = -4.5, SE = 2.4, p = .048. In contrast,
low self-esteem participants that were high in need for closure agreed less with the
positive message (self-verified) when death was salient than in the control condition, β =
4.4, SE = 2.1, p = .04 (see Figure 1).
I next conducted the same analyses with only data from participants that read the
unworthy message. Results revealed no interaction effects (ps >. 3), including no 3-way
(p > .3), but did reveal a main effect for closure, β = .56, SE= .24, p < .04. People high in
need for closure agreed more with the unworthy message than people low in need for
closure, β = .19, SE= .07, p < .02.
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Discussion
I started with the question of why some Christians seem drawn to a view of a less
loving God (Kirkpatrick, 1998). Consistent with TMT (Greenberg, Solomon &
Pyszvzynski, 1986), I hypothesized that high self-esteem should buffer mortality
concerns, such that people with high self-esteem should not be influenced by the death
prime. But drawing on SVT (Swann, 1983), and work merging lay epistemic theory and
TMT (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2002), individuals low in self-esteem (and high in need
for closure), should actually endorse epistemic needs over esteem needs. Thus, they
should self-verify. Support for these hypotheses was found in response to how much
people agreed with the positive message: you are worthy of God’s love. In this condition,
individuals high in self-esteem, regardless of closure, were not influenced by the death
prime. But, people low in self-esteem, but high in need for closure, believed this message
less when death was salient (self-verified). And also as predicted, people low in selfesteem and closure agreed more (enhanced) when death was salient.
In terms of religious belief, people low in self-esteem view god as less loving, but
also are more drawn to these relationships (Kirkpatrick, 1998). However, over time, they
are less likely to remain devout to religion (Kirkpatrick, 1998). This process of wanting a
relationship with a less loving God, and then not remaining devout to this relationship
could be driven somewhat by existential concerns. Specifically, this study suggests that
these concerns motivate these individuals (that are high in need for closure) to view God
as less loving. In so far as their self-esteem remains low, just like in human relationships
with non-verifying partners (e.g., De la Ronde & Swann, 1998), messages in church
about God’s unconditional love could actually hurt their chances of remaining devout to
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that religion. However, and somewhat ironically, perhaps more negative messages
surrounding their worthiness of love (e.g., every human sins and deserves Hell) could
perhaps keep them more devoted (just like negative views of spouses can increase
intimacy). Although speculative, it is likely that these individuals are drawn to God at a
time when they are higher in epistemic needs (e.g., uncertain about life, seeking answers)
and this, in conjunction with low-self esteem, could pose a potentially strong threat to
remaining religiously devote. This work suggests that this is because existential concerns
(which also are likely primed in this context) drive these individuals to seek out low selfesteem affirming messages, which is somewhat inconsistent with the message that God’s
love is unconditional.
Further, this process could partially explain why a correlation between religiosity
and subjective well-being exists (e.g., Myers, 2002). Take two people who are “new” to
religion that are low in self-esteem (Bob and Jimmy). If Bob is high in need for closure,
he will be existentially driven to verify that negative image, which could cause him to be
less devout or even to “quit” religion. Jimmy, however, is low in need for closure, so he
will be existentially driven to self-enhance and, because this would likely increase his
self-esteem over time, he will become more devout. Thus, in both cases, the link between
happiness and religion is maintained. But, the correlational link could be that happy
people remain religious, whereas unhappy people try religion and then drop out or
become less devout, as opposed to religion increasing happiness or vice versa.
Terror Management and Self-Esteem
Terror management theorists have long championed the need for need for selfesteem in managing death concerns (Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986).
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Research supporting this has found that mortality salience increases self-esteem
protection and self-enhancement (Mikulincer & Florian, 1998) and high self-esteem
(whether induced or trait) reduces the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense
(Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Consistent with, but building onto, past work, this study
found that high self-esteem also can buffer the effects of mortality salience on selfesteem defense. This is interesting because it demonstrates that self-esteem can buffer
mortality concerns even when the measured variable is directly related to self-esteem.
Moreover, this work demonstrates that high self-esteem also buffers individuals high in
epistemic needs, which have typically been associated with more defensiveness (e.g.,
need for structure, Landau et al., 2006). This suggests that self-esteem is a truly powerful
factor in managing death concerns.
However, this work also demonstrates that not all people (even individuals who
are not buffered by self-esteem) self-enhance when death is salient. Specifically, for
individuals low in self-esteem but high in need for closure, mortality salience actually
motivates less agreement with the positive feedback. The finding that individuals would
self-verify at the expense of self-esteem protection runs in stark contrast to TMT and
certainly merits future research attention.
Terror Management and Epistemic Needs
This research stands in a growing line of research demonstrating the need for
closure, structure and coherence in managing death anxiety. Specifically, the finding that
individuals high in need for closure, but low in self-esteem, self-verified suggests that the
need for closure can trump the need for self-esteem when death is salient. This is
consistent with the theorizing of Dechesne and Kruglanski (2004). However, unlike their
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work, it was not found that people high in need for closure agreed more with a negative
statement about the self when death is salient. Instead, they agreed more with the
negative statement regardless of the death prime. This could be because I measured selfesteem in addition to need for closure and they did not. To examine this possibility, I
removed esteem from the regression analysis. Again, however, there was no significant
effect for mortality salience compared to the control group in the negative message
condition (p > .12). Thus, it appears that other differences accounted for the discrepancy
in our findings.
Implications for Self-Verification
This research is the first to demonstrate that some people might not self-enhance
when death is salient. Thus, it adds to the understanding of the antecedents and conditions
for self-verification and self-enhancement. However, unlike SVT, which posits
verification as a global need that hinges on situational influences, this work demonstrates
that individuals’ epistemic needs might make them more likely to self-verify. This seems
consistent with the notion that people verify for epistemic needs. This is also consistent
with overlapping work in self-verification and need for closure work. For instance,
participants high in need for closure are more likely to have strong views and perceive
these views as important, both of which are related to more verification. Thus, this work
at least suggests that individual differences in need for closure are a factor in verification,
and in turn, could contribute to better understanding of these processes in the future.
Following Swann, I have suggested that people self-verified in this study in order
to serve epistemic needs. But, these needs very much overlap with the other need posited
to be served by verification: relationships. Thus, in so far as these two things can be
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teased apart, it could be that participants were verifying to serve relationship needs with
God. More likely, though, both of these needs were being met by individuals verifying
under mortality salience in this study.
Moreover, the urge to verify under mortality salience might be (like verification
when death is not salient) increased when the view is important and the view is specific
and matches the esteem measure. Because I pre-selected the measures based on matching
and specificity, it is possible that this increased verification under mortality salience.
Moreover, because there was a correlation between closure and religiosity (r = .56),
perhaps people verified under mortality salience, just like when mortality is not salient,
because of the importance of religion.
Seize and Freeze
Dechesne and Kruglanski (2004) have argued that mortality salience increases
need for closure, and in turn, people should cling more to any feedback (or any
information) when death is salient. From this perspective, I should have found increased
agreement with both positive and negative feedback when death was salient regardless of
self-esteem. For instance, Dechesne, Jansenn and van Knippenberg (2001) found that
participants high in closure agree more with feedback more under mortality salience
whether it is positive or negative, that people agree more with both a vignette supporting
an afterlife and one not supporting an afterlife and with completely contrary articles
about the reality of miracles. These results appear to conflict with my study. However, in
this work, these authors presented the feedback to individuals before mortality salience,
prompt them to remember it, and then rate their agreement after mortality salience (I
presented it only after mortality salience). Thus, in accord with research on need for
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closure, people high in need for closure are clinging to whatever is in the environment. If
no self-view is primed (like this study), then they rely on their readily available
information (self-views). However, if a view is primed prior to the study, then they seize
and freeze onto that.
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Coda
Much theory and research have explored and demonstrated the power of
epistemic needs or self-esteem needs in human motivation and attitudes. This study
suggests that both of these interact to influence attitudes. To its credit, the theory of terror
management stands practically alone (with self-verification theory) in noting the
importance of both these needs. However, TMT has long championed esteem needs over
epistemic needs (Greenberg, 2008). The current study suggests, however, that the typical
TMT view of self-esteem being most important in managing mortality concerns might be
incorrect, at least in certain cases. Specifically, people high in need for closure might be
more motivated by epistemic needs than esteem needs, even to the extent of believing
they are less worthy of God’s love.
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